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SALES
Lienholder's Rights vs. Good-Faith Purchaser. In General
Credit Inc. v. Winchester Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of Appeals,
by a four to three decision, ruled that the principle of equitable
estoppel adopted in Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corp.,2 was
not invalidated by the motor vehicle registration and licensing
statutes enacted in the Code of 1950.
The particular point in dispute was whether a properly re-
corded lien on an automobile given by a dealer to a finance com-
pany which left the car in the dealer's possession, knowing that
it would be offered for sale in the regular course of business, is
valid as against a purchaser for value without actual knowledge
of the lien.
The decision declared that the particular statute8 is restricted
to creditors of the dealer and cannot by construction be extended
to include purchasers from the dealer without reading into the
statute language which the legislature had not seen fit to place
there. It further stated that the statute was designed to super-
sede former provisions for recording a bill of sale for an automo-
bile or a chattel mortgage thereon in the local clerk's office by
requiring registration with a central state agency, thereby pro-
viding a simple means for ascertainment of liens against motor
vehicles.4
General Credit Inc. was held to have waived the stipulation
in the chattel mortgage by knowingly permitting the dealer to
place the automobile in his stock and to offer it for sale indis-
criminately to his customers in the usual and ordinary course of
business. It could not thereafter claim the automobile from a
purchaser for value from the dealer who had no actual notice of
the existence of the mortgage, even though it was recorded.
In effect the ruling maintains and reiterates the law affecting
the protected status of the bona fide purchaser for value.
1 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E.2d 201 (1955).
2 127 Va. 563, 102 S.. 591, 10 A.L.R. 654 (1920).
8 Va. Code, 546-71 (1950).4 Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance Corp, 164
Va. 579, 583, 180 S.E. 408,409, 410 (1935).
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Express Warranty. The case of Clark v. Miller Manufac-
turing Co.,6 posed the question of whether an ambiguously
worded letter of a seller constituted an express warranty, an im-
plied warranty, or no warranty at all.
On appeal from the lower court, which found for the de-
fendant on the basis that no warranty existed, the U. S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment, ruling
that an express warranty was definitely determinable.
The issue developed from an exchange of letters made sub-
sequent to an order placed, by the buyer for boxes treated with a
certain chemical preservative. Following a written request by
the seller that the order be changed to include boxes impregnated
with another type of chemical preservative, the buyer replied that
if the change were to be effected it must rely on the seller's ex-
perience and requested reassurance in writing that the substitute
chemical would yield "as good results" as the other. The seller's
reply stated that all sources contacted reported that the substitute
chemical preservative was superior and that the seller felt sure
that the buyer would be well satisfied with boxes dipped in such
preservative. When used, the boxes treated with the recom-
mended chemical were found to be unsatisfactory and creative of
a disruptive effect on the buyer's business.
The higher court, well supported in Virginia on principle
and by authority,6 concluded that because of the buyer's very
definite statement of reliance on the seller and the seller's cor-
responding reply and actions, the seller intended to accept and
comply with the conditions stated by the buyer.
This opinion is significant in that the court found the basis
for an express warranty in the rather ambiguously worded letter
of the seller, although it appeared that a decision based upon an
implied warranty for suitability of purpose defuiitely would
have been justified.
5W. N. Clark Co. v. Miller Manufacturing Co., 224 F.2d 660 (1955).
6 Mason v. Chappell, 56 Va. 572, 582, 15 Grat. 572 (1860); Morse and Co. v.
Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817, 821 (1951); Uniform Sales Act,
Sec. 12.
Implied Warranty. In Gleason v. International Harvester
Co.,7 the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the
trial court that an installed "fifth wheel" was not reasonably fit
to be used for the purpose for which it was sold, and that the
manufacturer-wholesaler through whose branch office the fifth
wheel was sold was neither negligent nor guilty of breach of
contract. Instead, an independent dealer from whom the fifth
wheel was ultimately purchased was held liable for damages re-
sulting from a breach of implied warrantys as to the fifth wheel,
shown to be defective in operation only after installation by the
dealer's employees, who had failed to make reasonable inspection.
The facts in the case were shown to be distinguishable from
those in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,9 because the manufac-
turer-wholesaler was not shown to be guilty of any negligence.
The Court did acknowledge the existence of the current tendency
to extend the liability of a manufacturer to a remote vendee to
include articles not inherently dangerous and not dangerous when
properly constructed and put to their intended use, which if
defectively constructed may reasonably be anticipated to cause
injury to those properly using them.10 However, in view of the
facts applicable in this case it declined to decide whether the
modem rule should prevail in this jurisdiction.
Fraud and Deceit. Poe v. Voss"t concerned an action by the
vendees against the vendor, vendor's real estate broker, and the
broker's agent for alleged misrepresentations inducing vendees to
buy a house with a defective furnace.
The Court by a three to two decision considered the mis-
representations made by the real estate broker's agent to be mere
expressions of opinion and the vendees' opportunity to examine
the furnace sufficient to overcome the fact that they did not dis-
7197 Va. 255, 88 S.E.2d 904 (1955).8 Universal Motor Co. v. Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140 S.E. 653, 59 AL.R. 1174
(1927); Greenland Development Corp. v. Allied Heating Products Co,
184 Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 801 (1943).
9 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 AL.R. 559
(1946); General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320 (1943); Robey
v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 192 Va. 192, 64 S.E.2d 723
(1951); 46 Am. Ju, Sales, SS307 and 812 (1951).il 196 Va. 821, 86 S.E.2d 47 (1955).
cover its malfunction until after performance of the contract.
This decision is the more significant in that there had been a jury
verdict in the lower court in favor of the plaintiff.
Considering the circumstances of the case, the trial court
judgment upon the verdict for the plaintiff, and the strong dis-
senting opinion on appeal, it appears that the judgment for the
vendees could have been affirmed without doing violence to the
law. The Supreme Court of Appeals has thus strongly adhered to
the view that one who investigates for himself buys at his peril.
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